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Objective. To analyse the role of human rights in aid 
allocation of 21 donor countries. Methods. Econometric 
analysis is applied to a panel covering the period 1985 to 
1997. Results. Respect for civil/political rights plays a 
statistically significant role for most donors at the aid 
eligibility stage. Personal integrity rights, on the other 
hand, have a positive impact on aid eligibility for few donors 
only. At the level stage, most donors fail to promote respect 
for human rights in a consistent manner and often give more 
aid to countries with a poor record on either civil/political 
or personal integrity rights. No systematic difference is 
apparent between the like-minded countries commonly regarded 
as committed to human rights (Canada, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) and the other donors. 
Conclusions. Contrary to their verbal commitment, donor 
countries do not consistently reward respect for human rights 
in their foreign aid allocation. 
 
The bilateral allocation of aid is one of the foreign policy 
tools available to donor countries. It will therefore be 
determined to some extent by the self-interest of the donor 
country as well as the recipient country’s need for aid. Many 
donors claim that respect for human rights also plays a role 
in their allocation decisions (see for example, Tomaševski, 
1997; Gillies, 1999; Neumayer, 2003). This article tries to 
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assess what impact, if any, respect for human rights really 
has on the allocation of aid to recipient countries. 
The article differs and improves upon the existing 
literature on two major accounts: First, there has been too 
much exclusive focus on US aid allocation. Instead, this 
article examines the allocation of aid from all 21 countries 
that are members of the Development Assistance Committee of 
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Second, I avoid the implicit bias of some of the 
literature that has implicitly equated human rights with 
political/civil rights, sometimes explicitly subsumed under 
the heading of democratic governance. To do so, I introduce a 
further variable, namely personal integrity rights, which has 
been used before by a number of studies addressing US aid 
allocation (see, for example, Carleton and Stohl, 1987; Poe 
and Sirirangsi, 1994; Poe et al., 1994). Personal integrity 
rights are closer to the very core of human rights, referring 
to such things as imprisonment, disappearances, torture, 
political murder and other forms of politically motivated 
violence. 
Most of the existing literature has focused on the role of 
human rights in US foreign aid allocation. The results from 
these studies are somewhat inconclusive depending on which 
period is studied, whether economic or military aid is looked 
at and the methodology employed – see, for example, 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), Carleton and Stohl (1987), 
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Poe (1992), Poe and Sirirangsi (1994), Abrams and Lewis 
(1993), Poe et al. (1994), and Apodaca and Stohl (1999). 
As concerns aggregate bilateral aid flows, Trumbull and Wall 
(1994) include a variable for political/civil rights in panel 
estimations for 1984-89 finding a positive relationship 
between rights and the receipt of aid. This author has 
analyzed the role of human rights in the allocation of 
aggregate bilateral and multilateral aid in a panel from 1984 
to 1995 (Neumayer, 2002). He distinguishes between 
civil/political and personal integrity rights (see section 
below), finding that as concerns bilateral aid flows countries 
with higher respect for civil/political rights and those with 
improving respect for personal integrity rights receive more 
aid. As concerns multilateral aid flows, only improvements in 
the respect for civil/political rights exert a statistically 
significant positive impact on the allocation of aid. 
Few studies addressing bilateral aid flows from donors other 
than the US have analyzed the role of human rights. Svensson 
(1999) and Alesina and Dollar (2000) examine various donor 
country’s aid allocation in pooled regressions covering the 
period from 1970 to 1994. The results of these previous 
studies are compared to the ones from this analysis in the 
concluding section. 
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Measuring Respect for Human Rights 
Almost all studies addressing aid allocation for a range of 
donors exclusively use Freedom House (2000) data for measuring 
the extent of a government’s respect for political rights and 
(sometimes) civil liberties within a country. Political rights 
refer to, for example, the existence and fairness of 
elections, the freedom to organize in different political 
parties or groupings, the existence of party competition, 
opposition and the possibility to take over power via 
elections. Civil liberties refer to, for example, the freedom 
of assembly, the right to open and free discussion, the 
independence of media, the freedom of religious expression, 
the protection from political terror, the prevalence of the 
rule of law, security of property rights and the freedom to 
undertake business, the freedom to choose marriage partners 
and the size of family. 
This paper also uses a variable measuring respect for 
personal integrity rights with data from the two Purdue 
Political Terror Scales (PTS) in accordance with most of the 
studies that specifically look at US aid allocation. Even 
though there is some overlap with the concept of civil 
liberties from Freedom House, these scales have a much clearer 
focus on what constitutes arguably the very core of human 
rights and they are not simply redundant.1 One of the two PTS 
is based upon a codification of country information from 
Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports to a scale 
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from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). Analogously, the other scale is 
based upon information from the US Department of State’s 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Codification is 
according to rules with regard to the prevalence of political 
imprisonment, disappearances, torture, political murder, and 
other forms of politically motivated violence within a 
country. 
The major difference between personal integrity rights and 
the political/civil rights from Freedom House data lies in two 
things: personal integrity rights violations are without doubt 
non-excusable and are not subject to the relativist challenge 
(see Perry, 1997). There simply is no justification whatsoever 
for political imprisonment, torture and murder. Governments 
that employ or tolerate such activities are guilty of 
political terrorism (hence the name of the scales). 
Political/civil rights violations do not carry quite the same 
status. One cannot dismiss the argument that these rights are 
contingent on a particular form of Western culture and that a 
certain amount of political/civil rights violations are 
somehow “necessary” for the stability of certain countries and 
the welfare of their people as easily as one can dismiss a 
similar argument with respect to political imprisonment, 
torture and murder (see, for example, Moon and Dixon, 1992). 
In this sense, McCann and Gibney (1996:16) are correct in 
arguing that the PTS refer to ‘policies within the developing 
world which all theorists and investigators would agree 
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constitute egregious miscarriages of political authority’ and 
represent ‘the most serious form of human rights abuses’. 
Note that the measures used in this study only capture what 
is sometimes called first-generation rights, but not economic 
and social rights, sometimes also called second-generation 
rights. There are mainly two reasons for this exclusion. 
First, governments can be better held responsible for 
violations of first-generation rights than for economic and 
social rights. Respect for the latter rights can be partly or 
wholly outside the reach of governmental action. It is 
difficult to discern whether low achievement of economic and 
social rights is a consequence of neglect or malevolent 
governmental activity or simply the consequence of a country’s 
poverty. Second, and related to this, low achievement of these 
rights might be reason for the receipt of more rather than 
less aid. The reason is the overlap with a country’s need for 
foreign aid. Countries with low gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita are more in need for foreign aid, but are also less 
likely to satisfy economic and social rights. 
 
Research Design 
The dependent variable. The dependent variable is net official 
development assistance (ODA) a country receives as a share of 
total net ODA allocated in that year by the donor country. ODA 
data over the period 1985 to 1997 are taken from OECD (2000), 
which provides data for all political units in the world 
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receiving aid, approximately 185 countries and dependent 
territories. Unfortunately, PTS data are unavailable for many 
of these, particularly the small countries and all the 
dependent territories. The remaining sample comprises a total 
of 105 countries. 
 
The independent variables. In accordance with the established 
literature, three kinds of independent variables are used 
here: need, interest and human rights variables. Also, 
population size is used as an explanatory variable to account 
for differences in the size of countries. In addition, year-
specific time dummies are included to account for changes over 
time that affect all recipient countries equally. 
The only need variable included is the natural log of GDP 
per capita in purchasing power parity in constant US$1995, 
taken from World Bank (2000). It is the by far most commonly 
and often only need variable used in the literature – see 
Neumayer (2003) for an overview of this literature. This is 
because it has good data availability and it is highly 
correlated with other need variables such as life expectancy, 
infant mortality or literacy. Neumayer (2003) demonstrates 
that these other need variables are insignificant once income 
is controlled for in case of most donors. Greater need should 
have a positive effect both on the probability of receiving 
aid as well as on the amount of aid allocated. 
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Four variables are used capturing different aspects of donor 
interest in line with the existing literature (see Neumayer, 
2003): The first is the number of years the recipient country 
has been a former colony of the donor in the 20th century 
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000). It is a well established result 
that many donors favor their former colonies in part at least 
because of a political interest in maintaining their influence 
on those countries. The second donor interest variable is the 
value of exports from the donor country (Gleditsch, 2001). The 
idea is that donors might want to promote their exports in 
giving more aid to countries that are major recipients of 
their good and services. The third variable is the 
geographical distance between the donor and the recipient 
country’s capital (Haveman, 2000).2 This variable can be 
expected to be significantly negative only for some donors 
that want to promote a regional sphere of influence in giving 
more aid to proximate countries, whereas the aid allocation of 
other donors has a more global orientation. The fourth 
variable attempts to measure a security interest of donors. 
Unfortunately, relevant variables are difficult to find for 
most donors. We take the military aid a recipient country 
receives as the share of total US military aid as our proxy 
variable (USAID 1999). Countries which receive a higher share 
of US military aid can be expected to be of greater importance 
to Western security interests. 
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The two human rights variables used have already been 
introduced and justified above. The first is the respect for 
personal integrity rights based upon the Purdue Political 
Terror Scales (PTS), where the simple average of the two 
indices was taken. If one index was unavailable for a 
particular year, the other one available was taken over for 
the aggregate index. The index was then reversed such that 1 
means worst and 5 means best human rights performance. 
The second variable is the combined political rights and 
civil liberties index from Freedom House (2000). They are 
based on expert surveys assessing the extent to which a 
country effectively provides for political rights and civil 
liberties, both measured on a 1 (best) to 7 (worst) scale. A 
combined political/civil rights index was created by adding 
the two variables so that the index ranges from 2 to 14, which 
was then reversed and transformed to a 1 (worst) to 5 (best) 
scale. 
 
Methodology. In accordance with, for example, Cingranelli and 
Pasquarello (1985) and Poe and Sirirangasi (1994), I assume a 
two-year lag of the independent variables, since decision-
makers are unlikely to have more recent data available at the 
time they allocate aid flows. This lagging of the independent 
variables should also reduce any potential problems of 
simultaneity. 
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Assessing the impact that respect for human rights has on 
the allocation of aid has to deal with the fact that not only 
do countries receive different amounts of aid, but some 
countries do not receive any aid at all from particular 
donors. In our sample, the share of positive observations 
ranges from as high as about 96 per cent in the case of France 
to as low as around 8 per cent in the case of Portugal. There 
are basically two options for dealing with this clustering of 
zero observations. One is to follow the lead of Cingranelli 
and Pasquarello (1985) and many others and to distinguish 
between two stages in the process of aid allocation. The first 
stage is the so-called gate-keeping stage where it is 
determined which countries receive aid. The appropriate 
estimation technique for this kind of analysis is probit, 
which is used throughout.3 The second stage is the level stage 
where it is determined how much aid as a share of total aid is 
allocated to a country, which has been selected as an aid 
recipient in the first stage. All regressions at this stage 
were estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS). One of the 
problems with this two-stage method is that it assumes that 
the errors in both stages are uncorrelated. In other words, it 
assumes that decisions at the gate-keeping stage are taken 
independently from the decisions at the level stage. 
The second method is Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimator, 
which explicitly allows the error terms from both stages of 
aid allocation to be correlated. However, the two-step 
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estimator works best with an exclusionary variable that has a 
significant impact upon the first step (gate-keeping stage), 
but not upon the second step (level stage). Otherwise the 
validity of estimations depends on restrictive distributional 
assumptions only. The problem is that such an exclusionary 
variable is frequently impossible to find. Another 
disadvantage of Heckman’s two-step estimator is that the model 
is highly sensitive towards model specification and 
estimations can be unstable. Due to these problems the two-
stage method was used for reporting the main results, but 
Heckman’s two-step estimator was used in sensitivity analysis. 
The dependent variable was logged in order to reduce the 
influence of outliers. All independent variables with the 
exception of the human rights variables were logged as well. 
Doing so allows an easy to understand elasticity 
interpretation of the estimated coefficient in the second 
stage estimations. The human rights variables were not logged 
since they are not cardinal variables with the consequence 
that it would be non-sensical to speak of a percentage 
increase in respect for human rights. The main results are not 
affected by whether or not the independent variables are 
logged. Since Cook-Weisberg tests rejected the hypothesis of 
constant variance, standard errors were used that are robust 
towards arbitrary heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Grouping donors. To guide our analysis, we distinguish three 
groups of donors: The big aid donors (France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the UK and the US), the so-called like-minded countries 
(Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) and the 
remaining smaller donors. The big aid donors are commonly 
regarded as pursuing their own interest, which might leave 
little room for promoting human rights (Svensson, 1999). The 
like-minded countries traditionally see poverty alleviation as 
the main objective of their aid giving. They are also commonly 
viewed as paying little regard to their own interest and as 
being committed to the pursuit of human rights in their 
foreign policy in general, and their aid allocation in 
particular (Tomaševski, 1993; Gillies, 1999; Neumayer, 2003). 
The small aid donors are somewhat in between the other two 
groups as concerns respect for human rights: they are perhaps 
freer to promote respect for human rights in their aid 
allocation than the big aid donors, but they do not have a 
strong reputation of being committed to human rights as the 
like-minded countries do. 
 
Results 
Table 1 provides probit estimation results of the gate keeping 
stage. The reported coefficients are not probit coefficients, 
which have no intuitive interpretation. Instead, they are 
already transformed into changes in the probability following 
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a marginal increase at the mean of a variable, with all other 
independent variables held at their mean values as well.4 
< Table 1 about here > 
Poorer countries have a higher chance of being eligible for 
aid receipt for all donors but Portugal. Population size has 
no consistent effect, but most donors, particularly the small 
ones, select more populous countries with higher probability. 
With the exception of Japan and the Netherlands, all donors 
give preference to their own colonies at this stage.5 In the 
case of Japan this is due to the traditionally problematic 
relationship between the donor and its former colonies, which 
were occupied during the Second World War. In the case of the 
Netherlands, it is due to a temporary withdrawal of Dutch aid 
to Indonesia in the mid-1990s due to anger about Indonesian 
politics in particular towards East Timor. Countries that 
receive a higher share of US military aid as well as those 
that import more from the donor are more likely to be eligible 
for the receipt of aid by most donors. Geographical distance 
does not exert a consistent influence at the aid eligibility 
stage. Only Australia, New Zealand and Portugal have a 
regional bias at this stage.6 
As concerns human rights, there are only few donors that 
give preference to countries with a good record on personal 
integrity rights. Indeed, in the case of Sweden, Luxembourg, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland, countries with a 
poor record are actually more likely to be eligible for aid 
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receipt. The situation is entirely different with respect to 
civil and political rights. With the exception of Germany, 
Australia, Austria, Ireland and Portugal, all donors give 
preference to countries with a good record on such rights. 
Comparing across groups of countries, no consistent pattern 
emerges. Most countries take recipient need as well as some 
aspect of donor interest into account. As concerns human 
rights, the like-minded countries do not stand out as a group. 
Denmark is the only like-minded country to give preference 
both to countries with greater respect for personal integrity 
rights and to those with greater respect for civil and 
political rights. The smaller donors fare no better than the 
big donors. 
Results from the level stage are reported in table 2. With 
the exception of Luxembourg, New Zealand and Portugal all 
donors allocate a higher share of their aid to poorer 
countries. As expected, the income elasticity for the like-
minded donor countries is quite high in absolute terms 
demonstrating their commitment to poverty alleviation.7 The 
majority of donors also allocate a higher share to countries 
with a greater population size as one would expect. Note that 
the estimated elasticity for the population variable is 
clearly below one for all donors, which confirms the so-called 
population bias in aid allocation already suggested by Isenman 
(1976): more populous countries receive more aid, but the aid 
increase is less than the proportional population increase. 
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With the exception of Japan and the United States, all 
donors give a greater percentage of aid to their former 
colonies. For Japan, the reason is analogous to its bias 
against its former colonies at the gate-keeping stage. For the 
US, such a bias is highly implausible. The Philippines is the 
only US colony in our sample with traditionally good relations 
to its former colonial power. If the variable ‘US military 
aid’ were not included in the model, then the colony variable 
would become positive. The colony variable is insignificant in 
our model because the effect is picked up by the ‘US military 
aid’ variable. 
All big donors with the exception of the UK, give more aid 
to countries which receive high shares of US military aid. 
With the exception of Canada (a close ally of the US), none of 
the like-minded countries does, which is in line with our 
expectations. All the big donors promote their exports in 
giving more aid to major importers of their goods and 
services. On this aspect, the like-minded countries are not 
free of pursuing their interest in aid giving as they also 
give more aid to major importing countries, with the exception 
of the Netherlands. The small donors vary on both of these 
aspects of donor interest. As concerns a regional bias, our 
results confirm what is commonly known about certain donors: 
Germany, Austria and Switzerland give some preference to 
Eastern European and Mediterranean countries, Japan to East 
Asian countries, the US to Latin American and finally 
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Australia and New Zealand to Pacific recipient countries. The 
other donors do not share this regional bias. 
As concerns human rights, there is no consistent pattern 
across donors. With respect to personal integrity rights, 
France, Japan, the UK, Canada, Denmark and Australia provide 
countries with a good record with a higher share of aid. The 
opposite is true for Italy, the US, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Luxembourg and Spain. The variable tests insignificantly for 
the remaining countries. There is no systematic difference 
between the big aid donors, the like-minded countries and the 
small donors. As concerns civil and political rights, the 
results paint a similarly complex picture. Germany, Japan, the 
UK, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland give more aid to 
countries with a good record. The opposite is true for France, 
Australia, Austria and Belgium, whereas civil and political 
rights exert no statistically significant influence on aid 
allocation by the remaining countries. Again, there is no 
systematic difference apparent across the groups of aid 
donors. 
< Table 2 about here > 
Sensitivity analysis 
It is sometimes suggested that the US Department of State’s 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are subject to some 
ideologically motivated bias. Poe, Carey and Vazquez (2001) 
test this hypothesis and find some limited evidence that at 
times, particularly in the early years, the US Department of 
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State favoured allies of the US in its reports and was biased 
against its enemies. Replacing the variable used in the 
regressions reported above, which combined the PTS derived 
from the US Department of State’s and amnesty international’s 
reports, with the one based on the latter only leads to 
broadly the same results.  
One might wonder whether human rights exert a greater 
influence in the post Cold War period (1991-1997) as compared 
to the period of the Cold War (1985-1990). However, this is 
not the case. Breaking down the sample into two sub-periods 
did not suggest any systematically enhanced role of human 
rights in the post Cold War period. One might also be 
concerned about multicollinearity given that the two aspects 
of human rights are correlated with each other. However, 
variance inflation factors were computed and were all well 
below 5. Also, including each of the two human rights 
variables in isolation leads to broadly the same result as 
their simultaneous inclusion. Using Heckman’s two-step 
estimator instead of the two-stage method also hardly affects 
the estimation results on the human rights variables. Given 
that for many donors a Wald test fails to reject the 
hypothesis of independent equations at the two stages, this 
result is not very surprising, since the two-stage method 
assumes independence of the two equations. 
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Concluding Observations 
Existing studies that look at the role of personal integrity 
rights in addition to civil/political rights have focussed on 
US aid allocation. Studies looking at aid allocation by other 
donors have not included personal integrity rights. This 
article has attempted to fill this gap. Indeed, to the best of 
my knowledge, it is the first study analyzing comprehensively 
the role of human rights in the allocation of aid of all the 
21 member countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee. 
The results reported above convey a mixed picture of the 
role human rights play in the allocation of aid. On the one 
hand, respect for civil/political rights is a statistically 
significant determinant on whether a country is deemed 
eligible for the receipt of aid for most donors. Respect for 
these rights thus clearly plays a role as a gate-keeper for 
most donors. Respect for personal integrity rights, on the 
other hand, is insignificant for most donors. At the level 
stage, respect for civil/political rights and respect for 
personal integrity rights exert a positive influence on the 
pattern of aid giving of only few donors. 
Table 3 compares our results at the level stage to those of 
Svensson (1999) and Alesina and Dollar (2000), the only 
studies addressing the impact of civil/political rights on aid 
allocation by donors other than the US. Our results with 
respect to the effect of civil/political rights on aid 
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allocation are consistent with at least one of these studies 
in the case of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US, 
the Netherlands and Norway. For Canada and Denmark, Svensson 
(1999) finds a positive effect of civil/political rights. Our 
study suggests that it is personal integrity rights instead, 
which matter for these two donors, and that Svensson’s result 
is due to model mis-specification given that he does not 
control for these rights. A similar argument applies to 
Australia, for which Alesina and Dollar (2000) report a 
positive effect of civil/political rights, whereas our results 
suggest again that it is personal integrity rights which 
matter. Only in the case of Sweden does our study fail to find 
any positive effect of human rights on aid allocation contrary 
to Svensson’s (1999) result. As concerns the US, our results 
confirm Poe and Sirirangsi’s (1994) finding that human rights 
matter at the aid eligibility stage and not at the level stage 
as suggested by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985). 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
One of the major results of this paper is that the like-
minded countries do not fare better as a group than the other 
donors in spite of usually being portrayed (not least by 
themselves) as committed to the pursuit of human rights. This 
does stand in contrast to Svensson (1999) and Alesina and 
Dollar (2000). What this paper has shown is that the impact of 
human rights on aid allocation by these countries is much less 
consistent than the other studies would suggest. The 
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Netherlands and Norway indeed provide more aid to countries 
with higher respect for civil/political rights, but also less 
aid to countries with higher respect for personal integrity 
rights. Canada and Denmark provide more aid to countries with 
higher respect for personal integrity rights, but not 
civil/political rights. Indeed, there are only two countries 
(Japan, UK), which give more aid to countries with greater 
respect for both aspects of human rights, and they belong to 
the group of big aid donors, not like-minded countries. 
All in all, the results reported in this study are rather 
sobering from a normative point of view. Respect for human 
rights does not exert a consistent influence on aid allocation 
by most donors. There is inconsistency across the two stages 
of aid giving as well as across the different aspects of human 
rights. There is not a single donor, which would consistently 
screen out countries with low respect for civil/political and 
personal integrity rights and would give more aid to countries 
with higher respect for both aspects of human rights. If 
donors want to appear less hypocritical about their commitment 
to the pursuit of human rights, then our analysis suggests 
that they still have a long way to go. 
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NOTES
                                                 
1 Indeed, the partial Pearson correlation coefficient is not 
very high (r = .21; n = 1262). 
2 Distance to Sweden functioned as a proxy for Denmark, 
Finland and Norway; Spain as a proxy for Portugal; the United 
Kingdom as a proxy for Ireland and Australia as a proxy for 
New Zealand. 
3 Alternatively, logit estimation could have been undertaken. 
The two techniques provide very similar results in standard 
situations. 
4 Note that the probabilities are contingent on specific 
values of the independent variables because the probit model 
is nonlinear, and therefore nonadditive, in the probabilities. 
5 The result “100% success” means that all colonies are given 
aid in all years. Note that due to statistical reasons, these 
observations need to be dropped and the estimated 
probabilities refer to the remaining observations only. 
6 Australia and New Zealand notoriously concentrate their aid 
in the Pacific region. 
7 Note, however, that the income elasticity of Italy, Japan 
and Finland is also very high. 
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Table 1: Gate-keeping stage (probit estimation). 
 
 
donor 
 
 
income 
 
 
pop 
 
 
colony 
US 
military 
aid 
 
 
exports 
 
 
distance 
personal 
integrity 
rights 
civil and 
political 
rights 
Pseu-
do 
R2 
 
 
N 
The big donors:          
France -.06** 
(6.32) 
-.01 
(1.08) 
100% 
success 
.01 
(1.93) 
.02** 
(5.90) 
.03** 
(3.57) 
.01* 
(2.03) 
.02** 
(3.73) 
.2525 1001 
Germany -.04** 
(7.75) 
.01** 
(3.04) 
100% 
success 
.01** 
(2.91) 
.00 
(.06) 
.02** 
(4.48) 
.01 
(1.48) 
.01 
(.63) 
.3887 1188 
Italy -.22** 
(11.49) 
.01 
(1.54) 
100% 
success 
.03** 
(4.19) 
.03** 
(5.14) 
.01 
(.52) 
.00 
(.06) 
.04** 
(3.16) 
.2732 1259 
Japan -.08** 
(9.86) 
-.01** 
(3.00) 
-.06 
(1.92) 
.01 
(1.67) 
.01** 
(3.76) 
.01 
(.68) 
.01 
(1.35) 
.04** 
(5.89) 
.2778 1262 
United 
Kingdom 
-.13** 
(7.80) 
.05** 
(5.85) 
.04** 
(5.78) 
.01 
(1.17) 
-.02* 
(2.23) 
-.02 
(1.67) 
.01 
(.60) 
.04** 
(4.71) 
.2643 1262 
United 
States 
-.27** 
(14.13) 
-.05** 
(4.64) 
100% 
success 
.05** 
(6.93) 
.01 
(1.19) 
.01 
(.21) 
.03** 
(2.50) 
.04** 
(3.12) 
.2997 1248 
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The like-minded countries:         
Canada -.14** 
(13.19) 
-.01** 
(2.58) 
 .01 
(1.78) 
.02** 
(5.49) 
-.01 
(.37) 
.01 
(1.42) 
.03** 
(4.10) 
.3345 1262 
Denmark -.36** 
(13.21) 
.05** 
(3.28) 
 .01 
(1.22) 
.04** 
(3.25) 
.05 
(1.77) 
.05** 
(2.89) 
.04** 
(2.38) 
.2201 1262 
Nether-
lands 
-.12** 
(10.52) 
.02** 
(4.00) 
-.05** 
(4.42) 
.01 
(1.90) 
-.01* 
(2.35) 
.06** 
(5.82) 
-.01 
(1.59) 
.04** 
(5.51) 
.4243 1262 
Norway -.20** 
(9.57) 
.06** 
(5.39) 
 .02** 
(3.70) 
-.01 
(.46) 
.00** 
(4.13) 
-.01 
(.97) 
.03* 
(2.22) 
.2310 1262 
Sweden -.20** 
(8.31) 
.03 
(1.88) 
 .01* 
(2.31) 
.04** 
(5.06) 
.06** 
(2.82) 
-.06** 
(3.71) 
.07** 
(4.30) 
.2699 1262 
The smaller donors:         
Australia -.24** 
(8.85) 
.03* 
(2.18) 
100% 
success 
.03** 
(4.47) 
.04** 
(4.68) 
-1.24** 
(12.21) 
.04* 
(1.97) 
-.02* 
(1.06) 
.3037 1250 
Austria -.07** 
(2.99) 
.08** 
(5.10) 
 -.01 
(1.77) 
.03** 
(3.83) 
.04 
(1.91) 
-.02 
(1.11) 
.01 
(.74) 
.1584 1262 
Belgium -.16** 
(9.43) 
-.01 
(.75) 
100% 
success 
.05** 
(5.70) 
.02** 
(3.29) 
.12** 
(6.21) 
-.00 
(.07) 
.04** 
(2.79) 
.2153 1234 
28 
Finland -.21** 
(8.06) 
.13** 
(8.26) 
 .01 
(1.81) 
.04** 
(4.32) 
.03 
(1.07) 
-.03 
(1.46) 
.04** 
(2.36) 
.2344 1261 
Ireland -.22** 
(9.75) 
.05** 
(4.54) 
 -.01 
(.52) 
.01 
(.35) 
.09 
(3.03) 
-.02 
(1.17) 
-.01 
(.22) 
.2521 1262 
Luxembourg -.09** 
(4.45) 
.07** 
(5.78) 
 .01 
(1.16) 
-.01 
(1.25) 
-.04 
(1.76) 
-.04* 
(2.75) 
.04* 
(2.51) 
.1842 917 
New 
Zealand 
-.09** 
(5.64) 
.05** 
(5.69) 
 -.01 
(1.48) 
.01* 
(2.00) 
-.70** 
(13.85) 
-.06** 
(4.62) 
.07** 
(5.45) 
.4625 1257 
Portugal -.00 
(.09) 
-.00 
(.28) 
.03** 
(4.46) 
-.00 
(.43) 
.01* 
(2.40) 
-.02* 
(2.13) 
-.02** 
(3.13) 
.01 
(.76) 
.3008 1262 
Spain -.14** 
(6.44) 
.02 
(1.86) 
 .03** 
(3.40) 
.06** 
(7.12) 
-.02 
(.86) 
-.08** 
(4.49) 
.07** 
(4.26) 
.2853 1176 
Switzer-
land 
-.15** 
(6.59) 
.03** 
(3.36) 
 .02** 
(3.42) 
.00 
(.35) 
-.01 
(.57) 
-.03** 
(2.65) 
.05** 
(3.98) 
.2672 1257 
Note: Dependent variable is aid eligibility (1 =  receives aid; 0 =  does not receive aid). 
Robust standard errors. Absolute z-values in brackets. Year-specific time dummy coefficients not 
reported. Coefficients represent change in probability at the mean of independent variables due 
to marginal increase in the variable. * statistically significant at 95% level ** at 99% level 
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Table 2: level stage (OLS estimation). 
 
 
donor 
 
 
income 
 
 
pop 
 
 
colony 
US 
military 
aid 
 
 
exports 
 
 
distance 
personal 
integrity 
rights 
civil and 
political 
rights 
 
 
R-sq 
 
 
N 
The big donors:         
France -.52** 
(9.85) 
.36** 
(10.10) 
.49** 
(18.61) 
.11** 
(8.34) 
.20** 
(6.01) 
.03** 
(3.57) 
.11** 
(2.93) 
-.13** 
(3.49) 
.6284 1183 
Germany -.58** 
(10.73) 
.52** 
(17.88) 
.41** 
(8.93) 
.12** 
(10.17) 
.09** 
(4.65) 
-.15** 
(2.72) 
.06 
(1.54) 
.15** 
(4.03) 
.5713 1165 
Italy -.90** 
(11.00) 
.17** 
(3.97) 
.54** 
(9.53) 
.14** 
(7.06) 
.18** 
(5.92) 
-.09 
(1.01) 
-.18** 
(3.12) 
.09 
(1.44) 
.2759 985 
Japan -.82** 
(11.55) 
.52** 
(12.46) 
-1.03* 
(3.98) 
.13** 
(7.24) 
.20** 
(6.82) 
-.51** 
(4.02) 
.21** 
(3.42) 
.13** 
(2.68) 
.4548 1150 
United 
Kingdom 
-.55** 
(7.75) 
.61** 
(20.05) 
.53** 
(25.35) 
.02 
(1.23) 
.05* 
(2.45) 
.09 
(1.03) 
.11* 
(2.42) 
.13* 
(2.72) 
.5852 1030 
United 
States 
-.18* 
(2.34) 
.23** 
(5.58) 
.06 
(.92) 
.25** 
(13.04) 
.05* 
(2.40) 
-.41** 
(3.86) 
-.17** 
(3.53) 
.10 
(1.89) 
.3983 933 
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The like-minded countries:         
Canada -.77** 
(11.85) 
.38** 
(9.19) 
 .12** 
(7.24) 
.18** 
(7.64) 
-.00 
(.04) 
.13** 
(2.80) 
-.04 
(.76) 
.4181 1097 
Denmark -.82** 
(7.96) 
.31** 
(5.44) 
 -.01 
(.34) 
.15** 
(2.98) 
.11 
(1.03) 
.25** 
(3.43) 
.05 
(.80) 
.2103 682 
Nether-
lands 
-.81** 
(12.80) 
.37** 
(9.73) 
.52** 
(4.73) 
.09 
(5.07) 
.05 
(1.63) 
.42** 
(4.41) 
-.16** 
(4.41) 
.26** 
(5.34) 
.3568 1061 
Norway -1.03** 
(11.73) 
.21** 
(4.33) 
 -.07** 
(3.86) 
.10** 
(2.89) 
.00** 
(4.20) 
-.13** 
(2.19) 
.17** 
(3.04) 
.2740 921 
Sweden -.82** 
(7.01) 
.11 
(1.74) 
 -.08** 
(3.64) 
.21** 
(4.51) 
.21* 
(2.18) 
-.10 
(1.50) 
.01 
(.11) 
.1801 858 
The small donors:         
Australia -.62** 
(4.43) 
.38** 
(4.99) 
.33** 
(2.68) 
.12** 
(4.54) 
-.03 
(.48) 
-3.71** 
(12.62) 
.17* 
(2.27) 
-.23** 
(2.59) 
.4490 602 
Austria -.19* 
(2.51) 
.31** 
(5.84) 
 .03 
(1.49) 
.12** 
(3.42) 
-.48** 
(6.13) 
-.07 
(1.25) 
-.15* 
(2.55) 
.2634 847 
Belgium -.23** 
(3.30) 
.37** 
(9.42) 
.76** 
(17.83) 
.07** 
(3.51) 
.02 
(.64) 
.09 
(.92) 
.06 
(1.25) 
-.19** 
(3.71) 
.3194 972 
31 
Finland -1.11** 
(10.88) 
-.02 
(.26) 
 -.03 
(1.41) 
.34** 
(7.77) 
-.08 
(.73) 
-.12 
(1.65) 
-.01 
(.14) 
.2728 670 
Ireland -.58** 
(5.25) 
.02 
(.31) 
 .01 
(.25) 
-.03 
(.58) 
.48** 
(3.44) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.04) 
.2969 391 
Luxembourg -.09 
(1.16) 
-.09 
(1.93) 
 .02 
(.72) 
.02 
(.64) 
.15 
(1.61) 
-.18** 
(3.15) 
.10 
(1.60) 
.1435 357 
New 
Zealand 
-.02 
(.25) 
.18 
(5.95) 
 .10** 
(5.14) 
-.21 
(.31) 
-2.56** 
(23.83) 
-.00 
(.05) 
-.08 
(1.90) 
.7649 303 
Portugal -.05 
(.19) 
.23* 
(2.15) 
1.33** 
(12.27) 
.13 
(1.83) 
-.08 
(1.06) 
.17 
(.77) 
.02 
(.21) 
.02 
(.16) 
.9258 76 
Spain -.36* 
(2.44) 
-.12 
(1.81) 
 .02 
(.53) 
.35** 
(6.74) 
.77** 
(4.38) 
-.24** 
(2.91) 
-.01 
(.10) 
.2063 554 
Switzer-
land 
-.80** 
(8.95) 
.33** 
(7.82) 
 .07** 
(3.96) 
.00 
(.03) 
-.16* 
(2.23) 
-.08 
(1.61) 
.20** 
(3.95) 
.2794 1019 
Note: Dependent variable is log of aid as a percentage of total aid. Only countries with 
positive aid receipts included. Robust standard errors. Absolute t-values in brackets. Year-
specific time dummy coefficients not reported. * significant at 95% level ** at 99% level 
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Table 3: Level stage results in comparison to previous studies. 
Country Svensson 
(1999) 
Alesina & 
Dollar (2000) 
This study: 
civil/political 
rights 
This study: 
integrity 
rights 
The big donors:    
France - not sign. - + 
Germany not sign. + + not sign. 
Italy - not sign. not sign. - 
Japan not sign. + + + 
UK + + + + 
US not sign. + not sign. - 
The like-minded countries:   
Canada + + not sign. + 
Denmark + not ex. not sign. + 
Netherlands not ex. + + - 
Norway + not ex. + - 
Scandinavia not ex. + not ex. not ex. 
Sweden + not ex. not sign. not sign. 
The small donors:    
Australia not ex. + - + 
Austria not ex. not sign. - not sign. 
Belgium not ex. not sign. - not sign. 
Finland not ex. not ex. not sign. not sign. 
Ireland not ex. not ex. not sign. not sign. 
Luxembourg not ex. not ex. not sign. - 
New Zealand not ex. not ex. not sign. not sign. 
Portugal not ex. not ex. not sign. not sign. 
Spain not ex. not ex. not sign. - 
Switzerland not ex. not ex. + not sign. 
 
Note: “+” means positively significant; “-” negatively 
significant; “not sign.” not significant; “not ex.” not 
examined. 
